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INTRODUCTION
This paper will examine some of the chief topoi in Aristotle's Topics dealing
with opposition. The first part of the paper will summarize some of the
discussion about the nature of a topos itself with the aim of providing a
backdrop for the discussion of particular topoi of contrariety. The second part
of the paper will be concerned with a detailed analysis of the topoi of
contrariety. Both the general principles involved in the arguments as well as the
concrete arguments will be given a developed presentation. The third part of
the paper will exemplify how some contemporary arguments can be viewed as
employing the Aristotelian topoi which are under consideration.
There may be some question regarding the reason this paper focuses on the
cases dealing with opposition or contrariety. It would be wonderful to have a
complete layout of all the topoi in the entire work of Aristotle, but a paper is no
place to attempt that. Given the difficulty of such an enterprise, the choice of
contrariety seems an attractive one. First of all, argumentation -- especially in
the case of dialectical debate -- rests on opposing or conflicting claims and
predications. A topos of contrariety seems to carry this aspect of
argumentation "on its sleeve." Second, the concrete examination of at least
some particular topoi should lead to a better understanding of not only what
Aristotle may have meant by a topos, but also how particular topoi function in
ordinary argument. Third, the topoi involving opposition lead to some
interesting reflections on the role of ontological principles in argumentation.
One might argue that there are other topoi which would reveal this as well and
this is no doubt true. A classic case would be that of much of what Aristotle
says about species and genera. However, the relationship of opposition to
substance is so basic that it prompts reflection on the nature of how the




Before examining the notion of topos itself, a quick review of the status of the
work whose title is paronomously derived from the term topos is in order. The
Topics is a work that for a greater part of twentieth century scholarly history has
neglected. One of the earliest recent work to draw attention to the book was
the French work by W.A. de Pater (1965). Shortly after the appearance of this
work the English speaking world evidenced its interest in the historical
dimensions and purpose of the Topics in G.E.L. Owen's edited volume (1968).
The Bude series contains a first volume done by Brunschwig but remains
incomplete (1967). Years later, Tricot's (1984) French translation and edition of
the Topics appeared but while it contains some notes with interesting
references to older writers, it is not very detailed and takes no interest in
analyzing the arguments formally. Recently Robin Smith (1997) has published
a commentary of books I and VIII of the Topics in the Clarendon Series.
Currently a detailed commentary on the Topics is being prepared by M. Erler in
German for publication by the WBG, but it was announced long ago and its
editorship has changed hands – it is still to make its appearance.1 However,
there have been a number of monographs which appeared in this timeframe
and which showed interest in the subject matter of the Topics even if these
works were not limited to it. This was true of H. Stachowiak's work (1971)
which tried to enumerate many of the Topic rules relevant to definition. J.D.G.
Evans monograph (1977), while it was concerned with the notion of dialectic,
thoroughly utilized passages from Aristotle's work. More recently, however,
there have appeared other investigations of the Topics such as that of Stump
(1978) and Green-Pedersen (1984). The very title of Paul Slomkowski's work
(1997) exhibits its focus on this work. The French piece by Y.Pelletier (1991)
has as its focus the Topics even though it covers various facets of dialectical
debate in antiquity. There are also a number of works by contemporary
medieval scholars which also manifest this revived interest in the Topics.
However, the word "revived" interest should be used with caution since this
later group of works demonstrates that there was considerable interest in the
Topics earlier in the history of philosophy.2
The notion of a topos is a difficult one to define. The very nature of topos, the ti
esti of topos, is – as has been noted by several commentators -- left undefined
by Aristotle in the Topics itself.3 There is considerable dispute in the literature
whether it should be translated as a principle, rule, argument form, or even
premise. De Pater provides a frightfully long list of options by citing some of
the attempts to translate the Greek term topos. He notes that topoi have been
called: "lines of argument" "seats/residences/housings of arguments", "points
of view", "middle terms", "premises deduced from a precept", "principles of
solution for the four problems", "majors of several arguments", "non-analytical
premises", "formulas for investigation", "pigeon holes for arguments", "a
common reasoning process", to name a few.4 These more recent attempts at
definition have often arisen in ignorance of some of the older attempts to arrive
at a sense of topos. The large older commentary tradition which has grown up
around the Topics can be usefully consulted here. Both the Greek and the
Medieval commentators have offered some insights on the nature of the topos
itself. Green-Pedersen has provided a useful survey of the history of work on
the Topics and he notes some of the key changes which take place in
attempting to define a concept which Aristotle never did. He notes that the
early commentator Alexander Aphrodisias defines a topos as an arche
(principle) or stoicheion (element) of an argument. However, Alexander himself
is aware of alternate interpretation on this matter; he reports that Theophrastus
distinguished within the topos, the parangelma (precept) and the sentence
(logos – protasis) for which he retained the word topos. Boethius thought that a
topos could be stated as a conditional sentence which would function as a
maxim for reasoning. However, he rarely formulated it in this manner.
Moreover, since there were an exceedingly large number of maxims he
distinguished two senses of locus (topos): one, as mentioned, namely that of a
maxim itself, the other which meant the difference under which a number of
similar maxims could be catalogued for easier use. It seems to be the
medieval tradition, if I rightly understand Pedersen (1984: 141) which links the
hypothetical syllogism to the topics.
In the paper I do not intend to resolve the dispute about the exact nature of the
topos. It is to be hoped that an examination of some particular topoi might
incidentally throw further light on this controversy. Robin Smith seems to be
correct in arguing that basic to the topos is an argument form.5 The Greek
expressions used by Aristotle might, in themselves, seem to indicate that
Aristotle is talking of some sort of implication or entailment. In this case it is
easy to suppose that he is talking about some sort of hypothetical syllogism as
the pattern in terms of which the locus can be understood or into which it can
be translated. But it is important to note that the use of the Greek terms
hepesthai and akolouthein for "to follow" often seem to be applied in
considering the relation of one predicate variable to another rather than in
considering the relation of one propositional variable to another. From this one
might think that Aristotle is primarily concerned about the relationships of ideas
one to another rather than about the relationship of logical forms. In any case
the Topics is a work of a practical sort – something which is obvious from its
stated attempt in Book One but which is also reflected in both the content of the




Book Two presents some interesting rules and their applications which show
some interesting links between the topoi of informal reasoning and the
ontological commitments behind them. It is clear that in this book of the Topics
Aristotle's adoption of a subject-predicate format is basic to his analysis of the
topoi. This seems clear from the use he makes of the expression "follow"
(akolouthein/hepesthai) in the text. Whereas one might expect that this
indicates the relationship of implication (or perhaps even entailment),
Aristotle's examples seem to indicate that he takes it to be the connection
between the subject and predicate. Of course contemporary predicate calculus
normally represents that relationship in terms of the implication symbol
(arrow/horseshoe). Further, the role of the doctrine of the Categories seems to
be playing a significant role; the following consideration of his enumeration of
the particular topoi of contrariety will show this.
After having spoken about the ways in which combinations can be contraries
(II, c. 7) Aristotle invokes a principle to be employed when confronting two
opposing propositions. The principle seems to be a special case of the
principle of non-contradiction and is stated 113a20:
P1: If an accident belongs to a subject then the contrary of that accident cannot
belong to the same subject at the same time.
In this formulation one can suppose that there is understood the additional
proviso that both contrary accidents cannot pertain to a subject at the same
time "and in the same respect." Aristotle provides no example of this but he
does immediately issue another principle, closely related, which is exemplified.
P2: One must not ascribe a predicate to a subject if that predicate entails
another predicate which is contrary to yet another predicate implied by the
subject.6
The principle which he gives seems general enough, but the example he
provides is an "Academic" one. He argues that an opponent who maintained
that
S1: "Ideas exist in us."
would be found to be maintaining two conflicting propositions:
S1a: "The Ideas are immovable."
S1b: "The Ideas are moveable."
Aristotle seems to indicate that S1a should follow on the character of the Ideas
themselves; its truth is not dependent on the truth or even formulation of S1.
S1b, on the other hand, seems to follow from S1 by a consideration of both the
nature of ideas and the fact of their existence in us. Actually, this "inesse" ("to
be present in") of the Ideas is itself qualified in relation to the states of the
human subjects and since human subjects undergo the accident of motion, it
follows that the Ideas, as possessors of this "inesse" relationship, can
themselves be said to be moveable. {Clearly nothing more than
accidental/incidental moveable need be meant here -- the way a sailor is
incidentally moved by the ship under way at sea}. Thus, the first principle basic
to much commonsense reasoning, that a thing can possess only one member
of a pair of contrary attributes, is closely tied to Aristotle's logic and ontology.
The third principle which he raises is the following:
(P3) It is impossible that one member of a set of contrary accidents [C-
accidents] belong to a subject unless the other member also be potentially
predicated (in another way or at another time or both) of that same subject.
The example that Aristotle gives is stated as the following:
"For example, if your opponent has said that hatred follows anger, then hatred
would be in the spirited faculty; for anger is in that faculty. You must, therefore,
look whether its contrary, namely friendship, is also in the spirited faculty; for if
it is not there but in the appetitive faculty, then hatred cannot follow anger."
(Loeb trans.)
Aristotle does not formulate the details of this argument, but it seems that it
would have something like the following reductio ad absurdum format:
1). Friendship is the contrary of hatred
2). Contraries are in the same subject.
3). Anger is in the spirited faculty.
4). Hatred follows anger.
5). Friendship is in the appetitive or in the spirited faculty [or in the intellective
faculty].
6). Friendship is not in the spirited faculty.
7). Friendship is in the appetitive faculty.
8). Friendship and hatred are contraries. (1 reit.)
9). Friendship and hatred are in the same subject. (2)
10). Friendship and hatred are not in the same subject. (3, 7)
11). Hatred does not follow anger.(9 and 10)
One must note that the statements in Aristotle's argument itself are not stated
categorically; his argument is an example of a dialectical approach. He uses
the particle "if" (ei) to conditionalize 5, 6, and 7. Nonetheless, he seems to
offer this as an example of a topos that will be used to reject the opponent's
position by a reductio ad absurdum argument. This seems reinforced by his
later statement that this topos is to be used only by someone in "destructive
criticism" (anaskeuazonti - 113b8).7 Another feature to be noted here is the
importance of the ontological principle at work: "the same thing admits of
contraries" (113a35). This also seems to motivate his remark that an attempt
to use this topos in a constructive (kataskeuazonti) will fail unless it is limited to
establishing the mere possibility that a contrary could belong to a subject. The
particular examples Aristotle uses may or may not illustrate a "logic of
emotions" but they certainly do rely on a Platonic division of the soul which,
given the probable early dating of this work, is only to be expected.8
Aristotle expands his consideration of antithetical relationships and next
speaks (113b15) of four types of opposition that need to be considered. It
seems that to the generally admitted types of contradiction and contrariety, he
adds the opposition between the privation and having of states (114a7) and
the opposition of relatives (114a12). The first principle which is formulated in
terms of the contradictory relationships (antiphaseis) covers, in effect, those
cases of what Aristotle calls "reversed sequence". It is more commonly seen,
at least for the first grouping that he is dealing with, in the Principle of
Contraposition (P4) which he exemplifies by "If man is an animal, then not-
animal is not-man" and by "If the honorable is pleasant, the not-pleasant is not-
honorable." These function as instantiations of the Principle which then make
for the particular topos either constructively by affirming the simple categorical
antecedent (or, if the proposition were stated equivalently in converse order,
the complementary-negated categorical), OR destructively by denying the
contraposited consequent (or, if it were stated equivalently in converse order,
by denying the affirmative categorical). The type of the opposition in this
relationship of terms enables the topos to be used constructively and
destructively.
Aristotle then takes up the case contrary relationships properly so-called. He
takes up the "direct" (epi tauta) sequence (akolouthesis) first. It seems clear
here that he is dealing with akolouthesis as the predicate-subject relationship.
He writes,
"Now the sequence is direct in the case, for example, of courage and
cowardice; for virtue follows the former, vice the latter; and object of choice
follows the former, object of avoidance the latter."(113b31)
In other words,
S2: Courage is virtue.
S3: Cowardice is vice.
S4: Virtue is to be chosen.
S5: Vice is to be avoided.
The respective subjects of S2 and S3 are contrary to one another as their
respective predicates are contrary to one another. The same can be said of
S4 and S5. In dealing with reversed sequence, however, Aristotle notes that
although in some cases an analogue of contraposition would hold, in others it
does not. He provides as an example "Health follows upon good condition; but
disease does not follow upon bad condition, but bad condition upon disease."
Here one seems to have:
S6: A good condition is health.
S7: A bad condition is not disease.9
S8: Disease is a bad condition.
S6 and S8 stand to one another as analogues (in the realm of contrariety) to
the contraposited statements in the realm of the contradictory. Aristotle holds,
as would be expected, that such a reversed sequence is infrequent in the case
of contraries. He does, however, provide us with another rule:
(P5): "If the contrary does not follow the contrary either directly or in reverse
sequence, it is clear that neither does one of the terms in the statement follow
the other; but if one follows the other in the case of thee contraries, one term in
the statement must also necessarily follow the other."10
The third case that Aristotle raises is that of privation and having of states. It is
more difficult to see why Aristotle distinguishes this as a separate from the
previous two cases. The case of the contradictory and the contrary can be
seen as falling out differently even on merely formal grounds -- they are well
known to us from the square of contradiction and well known to Aristotle whose
discussion in De Interpretatione constitutes the basis for that square. It may be
that his own ontology of change, presented in the Physics and elsewhere in his
work, immediately called his attention to the different way in which this topic
would have to be treated. He focuses his attention immediately on the case of
the privation, probably because the case of having can be assimilated to one
of the two more general cases above. For this case the following principle
could be stated:
(P6) In the case of privations, a contrary that follows a contrary must do so
directly and not in reversed sequence.
The example Aristotle gives is that of blindness which is the privation of sight:
"sensation must follow sight and the absence of sensation must follow
blindness."
S9: Sight is a sensation.
S10: Blindness is an absence of sensation.
Whereas for S9 there is no problem in asserting its "reverse" S9* : "Non-
sensation is non-sight" it is problematic in the case of S10 to assert S10*:
"Non-absence of sensation is non-blindness" {'Non-' must be taken in a
privative sense}.
The fourth and last of the antitheses that Aristotle raises here is that of
relatives. The general rule here is that the sequence must be direct. He
provides two examples here, one that is mathematical and one that is
epistemological. Here one might find this rule at work:
(P7) If a thing is relative to another thing, then the predicate of the former is a
relative with respect to the predicate of the latter.
The first example is the following:
S11: Three times is a multiple.
S12: A third is a fraction.
In this case the rule would enable us to complete the topos much in the way that
one might fill in a missing element in a four term proportion: As 16/8 so 4/x,
where the x is clearly 2 given that the implicit mathematical rule is something
like: wherever a four term proportion is sought, the correct missing element will
be the one which enables the same relation as the ratio in the initial two terms.
Clearly the mathematical truths stated by Aristotle in S11 and S12 are fairly
basic and are only analogous to the proportion example which I raise. He
does, however, provide another instance of the relative topos under discussion
here, it is an example from epistemology:
S13: Knowledge is a conceiving
S14: The knowable is a conceivable.
S15: Sight is a sensation.
S16: The visible is a sensible.
The rule applies to each pair separately: if the subject of S13 is relative to the
subject of S14, then the predicate of S13 is relative to the predicate of S14.
This rule neatly encapsulates a basic principle at work in Aristotle's cognitive
psychology, namely, that there is an act – object correlation on both the
sensible and intellectual levels. Here, once again, is an indication of the
influence of Aristotle's philosophical ideas on the templates of informal
reasoning. Aristotle does propose as a possible counterinstance the case
raised by some, namely, "The sensible is knowable but sensation is not
knowledge." The effectiveness of this as a counterinstance rests on once
again using the rule to show how it fails due to the negation in the second
statement here:
S17: The sensible is knowable.
S18: Sensation is not knowledge.
Aristotle's response here is effectively that S17 is false. As he notes "many
deny" – note the endoxic character at work here – that there is knowledge of
sensibles (ton aistheton episteme), i.e., many deny that the sensible is
knowable. Furthermore, Aristotle argues, by negating S17 one arrives at
S19: The sensible is not knowable
This, in conjunction with the rule P7 would allow one to infer S17 (presumably
an endoxon admittedly by all) and hence the legitimacy of the topos is
confirmed rather than weakened.
3. CURRENT APPLICATIONS
How do these patterns of reasoning become relevant to those today who are
involved in informal logic? First of all it should be clear that Aristotle presents at
least some of these topoi as though they in themselves are not always
applicable. That is, they are not valid forms of reasoning in the sense that
deductive argument forms are valid. Second, it seems that they presuppose, at
least in some instances, certain ontological principles for what validity they do
have. Third, it seems that if these topoi can be formulated in a concise list, they
might prove useful in giving students a new logical "topography" in terms of
which they can analyze and criticize arguments. Perhaps in order to see this a
few contemporary examples of informal reasoning could be offered to make
the whole enterprise seem justifiable. Four examples are considered here.
The following pattern seems at work in the analysis of some years ago which
dealt with the effect of pressure on animal life in the ocean.11 One of the
issues which the research was trying to address is whether organisms
subsisting at high pressures (barophilic) would survive or flourish in thinner
environments as would other organisms that are (barophobic)12. Since
barophilic organisms also will be found in deep water which is cold, they can
be said to be psychrophilic (cold-lovers). On the other hand, the organisms that
seek lighter environments would, it seems, be thermophilic (heat-lovers). Here
one can be presented with a contrary topos that is at work, although it is
perhaps only a topos that guides research -- or as the medievals might say, a
topos enabling the inventio factor in reasoning. Consider this example:
E1: If something barophilic is psychrophilic, then something barophobic is
thermophilic.
One cannot be assured of this by some apriori intuition. Nor can it be validated
as an instance of the Law of Contraposition, since the consequent is not the
contraposite of the antecedent. Indeed, it need not be a true principle, yet it
seems to be a useful investigative principle and it seems operative in the
article just cited.
A recent obituary notice on Yehudi Menuhin presents an instance again of the
association of the contrary characteristics linked to contrary characteristics.
The obituary noted that Menuhin played better as a child than he did as an
adult. This was largely because he began to reflect too much on his technique
and lost some of his native intuition -- like the centipede who began thinking
about how to get about. (I suppose a better metaphor would be to say that he
became all thumbs). The line that encapsulated this idea read, "That the God
who gave the child such a rare gift should have left the man to make his own
way in the world should not be counted against Menuhin."13 This seems to
have the following topos in the background:
E2: If a child has a talent as a gift, then a man has a talent as an acquired
ability.
Again, the truth of the statement is open to question but the contrast of
contraries is at work.
Another example seems to be taken from the political domain. Recently a
Brooklyn jury ordered fifteen gun manufacturers pay 1/2 million dollars to a
person injured by gunshot fire. The report went on to note the reaction to this
decision. "The pro-gun activists think that the award was puny and predict that
the decision will be overturned but the anti-gun lobby is encouraged."14 The
topos that might be lurking behind their positive expectation might be said to
be this:
E3: "If a minor (jury) award entails insignificant policy changes, then a major
jury award entails significant policy changes."
Here too the connection between contraries seems to be operative in the
thinking of at least one party in the debate.
Finally, there is a case that displays contraries at work in two different subjects.
A book review of the lives of a father and son living in America at two different
periods of employment and prosperity, contrasts the fortune of each. One is an
immigrant baker, the other is his "yuppie management son." The reviewer
writes: "While papa's working life was emotionally rich and stable, his son's is
remarkably neurotic. Sonny boy has more money but no security."15 Here
several corresponding contrasts can be drawn: immigrant/native, emotionally
full (rich)/emotionally empty; stable/insecure; monetarily poor/monetarily rich.
These could be arranged in a sequence of separate contrarieties or in a
sequence of parallel continuing contrarieties. That is,
E4: If the immigrant is stable, then the native is insecure; if the immigrant is
poor, then the native is rich, etc. etc.
or
E5: If the immigrant is stable, poor, emotionally satisfied, then the native is
insecure, rich, and emotionally empty.
Another option is to relate the predicates of the two given subjects
(immigrant/native) to another in an implicatory fashion, i.e., being emotionally
full implies being stable; being emotionally rich implies being monetarily poor;
being stable implies being monetarily poor, etc.
 
CONCLUSION
The interest in the Topics is, then, not something that needs to be confined to
the classical scholar. Other examples informal reasoning would make even
clearer how widespread the contrariety topoi articulated by Aristotle influence
argument even today. A broader project, one that would try to clearly formulate
into principles the many topoi throughout the Topics, would be welcome and --
given the current interest in the work and the commentaries underway on it --
will no doubt be realized in the not too distant future. The informal logic
community could not only utilize such principles in its analysis of argumentation
but also try to examine what similar principles --beyond those articulated by
Aristotle – constitute other topoi either actually in use or potentially utilizable in
the contemporary logic.
ENDNOTES
1See WBG's Jahreskatalog 1998/99.
2There is, of course, the grand commentary tradition on Aristotle's works both
in the Greek and Latin traditions. In the West, beyond Boethius one can go
back all the way to Cicero as a philosopher who has drawn attention to
Aristotle's work by his own De Topicis.
3The Rhetoric, however, does provide one of Aristotle's typically concise
definitions at 1403a18.
4These are assigned respectively to the Oxford translation; Cicero, Quintillian,
and Cano; Hambruch, Prantl, Wieland; Prantl; Theophrastus; Gardeil;
Thionville; Plebe; Lausberg; Ross; and Schegk. See dePater 1965: 92-93.
5"At the core of a topos, then, there is an argument form: an abstract or
schematic statement of a conclusion-form and corresponding premiss-forms
from which it follows. However, the topos itself is not just this form, but this form
embedded in procedures for its use as part of Aristotle’s dialectical method."
(Smith 1997: xxvi).
6This principle seems to have a bit of the character of a parangelma. This
seems to occur in other sections where one finds, for instance, the use of
skopein – "to watch for".
7The remark follows the argument at 113b6:
1). The appetitive faculty is ignorant.
2). Contraries are in the same subject.
3). Knowledge is the contrary of ignorance.
4). The appetitive faculty is a subject capable of knowledge.
5). No. 4. is generally held to be false.
Quite clearly here Aristotle intends ignorance (agnoia) to be taken as the
contrary and not the complement of kowledge, since in the complementary
sense proposition 6 would be true.
8The Platonic influence seems to appear in this tripartite division -- one which
will continue to affect Aristotle in his later work --and is developed in detail in
the Republic and utilized in the Phaedrus.
9The Aristotle does not allow that "A bad condition is a disease" -- even
presupposing that the condition is one had by an organism -- is probably that
under the heading of a bad condition (for an organism) could be included such
things as dismemberment and death.
10This compressed formulation might be rendered more perspicuous by:
considering S2 – S5 and designating the subject of each by 'a' and the
predicate of each by 'b' immediately prefixed by the proposition number.
Aristotle's principle could then be read as saying: "If S3b does not follow S3a
either directly (S3a --> S3b) or indirectly (S3b --> S3a), then neither does S2b
follow S2a (S2a --> S2b). [Note that the x underscored means contrary of x just
as generally x superscored means the complement. ]
11Jannasch and Wirsen 1977:42.
12These would organisms that have an aversion (-phobic) to pressure.
13National Post, Saturday, March 13, 1999, p. A14.
14Globe and Mail, Saturday, March 6, 1999, p. A17.
15Globe and Mail, Saturday, March 6, 1999, p. D13.
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